







Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world, that is, 
justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief.  A 
key question now arises: which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by 
experiences?  I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind.  In particular, I 
evaluate the proposal that, if your experience E immediately justifies you in believing that P, then (i) E has 
the content that P, and (ii) E’s having the content that P is fixed by what it’s like to have E.  I start by 
clarifying this proposal and showing how it can be defended.  I then argue against the proposal and develop 
an alternative.  The discussion shows what role visual consciousness plays (and doesn’t play) in the 




This paper will examine how the nature of perception constrains the nature of our 
epistemic access to the world.  I will start by sketching a classic dialectic in the history of 
philosophy.  We will see how a similar dialectic arises in contemporary thought about 
perception, and we will see how it should be resolved.   
According to Hume, everyday opinion about perception 
 
is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be 
present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, 
through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate 
intercourse between the mind and the object (1748/2000, section 12). 
 
This is a statement of indirect realism.  On this view we do not have direct perceptual 
awareness of objects in the external world.  Rather, if we are perceptually aware of 
ordinary things at all, we are so aware only by being perceptually aware of other entities 
such as “images”, “ideas”, or “sense-data”.  Indirect realism is defended by a 
distinguished roster of philosophers, arguably including Descartes, Locke, and Russell.  
                                                 
* Acknowledgments omitted. 
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It is natural to object to indirect realism on epistemological grounds.  In 
particular, one might think that, if we are perceptually aware of ordinary things only by 
means of being perceptually aware of other entities such as “ideas”, then our experiences 
do not give us reason to believe that ordinary things exist.  We can find an expression of 
the worry in Berkeley, who frames it in terms of knowledge: 
 
But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without 
the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to 
know this? (1710/2008, section 18)1   
 
 A standard response to Berkeley’s worry focuses on the epistemic role of further 
factors in addition to experience.  In setting out the response I will focus on justified 
belief rather than the case of knowledge.  The key idea is that our experiences do give us 
reason to believe that particular external things exist, insofar as reference to those things 
figures in the best explanation of how our experiences arise, or insofar as our experiences 
are otherwise supplemented by background beliefs.  As Bertrand Russell puts it,  
 
. . . every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there really are 
objects other than ourselves and our sense-data which have an existence not dependent 
upon our perceiving them (1912: 24). 
 
 Whether or not Russell’s reply provides a way in which perceptual beliefs are 
justified, it presumably does not provide the only way in which perceptual beliefs are 
justified.  Imagine you are looking at a lemon and you demonstrate it (not an idea or 
sense-datum), forming a belief you express by saying “that exists”.  Do you need to rely 
on your reason to hold other beliefs to reasonably form so simple a belief as that?  A 
further challenge for indirect realism is whether it can allow for perceptual beliefs to be 
non-inferentially justified, that is, justified by experience alone.  That is the best version 
of the traditional “veil of perception” worry.  
Russell and other indirect realists actually can handle the best version of the 
traditional worry.  In maintaining that our perception of external things fails to be direct, 
they need not maintain that our epistemic access to the external world is mediated by 
background beliefs.  Perception is one thing, the justification of perceptual belief is quite 
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another.  The mediation of perception by ideas or sense-data does not require the 
mediation of justified perceptual belief by background beliefs.  Berkeley is thus mistaken 
when he writes that 
 
As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those 
things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will . . . this the 
materialists themselves acknowledge (1710/2008, section 18)  
  
The same mistake can arguably be found in Russell, when he reasons that 
 
. . . the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by 
sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at 
all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known (1912: 11). 
  
 For better guidance through the terrain, we should instead follow G.E. Moore, 
who writes that 
 
The mere direct apprehension of certain sense-data is quite a different thing from the 
knowledge of any proposition; and yet I am not sure that it is not by itself quite sufficient 
to enable me to know that pencil exists (1953: 125).2 
 
This paper will develop the better response to the worry about a “veil of 
perception”.  My aim however is not to vindicate indirect realism.  I will instead pursue 
the response in a parallel dialectic, one which comes up in contemporary debate about 
consciousness between philosophers such as Michael Tye and Sydney Shoemaker.  In the 
course of advancing their debate in the philosophy of mind, I will take on more general 
questions in epistemology, about the epistemic role of facts about what it is like to have 
an experience, and the epistemic role of facts about what experiences represent.3 
 In section 1 of the paper, I will introduce the contemporary debate in the 
philosophy of mind and show how the “veil of perception” objection can be stated in it.  
Section 2 will develop the case in favor of the objection, section 3 will show that the 
objection fails.  In section 4, I will conclude with a positive explanation of how 
indirectness in perception can go along with non-inferential justification.  
 
1. Consciousness and Representation 
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To see how the “veil of perception” worry arises in current philosophy of 
perception, we first need to introduce a debate about consciousness and representation.   
I will take it for granted that our visual experiences have contents, where, at a 
minimum, a visual experience has the content that P only if it is accurate only if P.4   
Our visual experiences also have phenomenal character, where two experiences 
have the same phenomenal character just in case what it’s like to have one is the same as 
what it’s like to have the other.5   
A much debated question now arises about the relation between the phenomenal 
character of a visual experience and its content: what content of a visual experience, if 
any, is shared by every experience with the same phenomenal character?  To address this 
question, we may introduce the term “phenomenal content” in the following way: 
 
(Definition of Phenomenal Content): For any experience E and any content C, C 
is a phenomenal content of E just in case every experience with the same 
phenomenal character as E has C.6 
 
The question in current philosophy of perception may now be put as follows: 
what are the phenomenal contents of visual experience?  This question arises for those 
who would aim to give reductive accounts of what experiences are in terms of what they 
represent, such as Tye (1992) or Dretske (1995), as well as for those with more moderate 
views which need not be reductive, such as Siewert (1998) or Chalmers (2004).7 
For example, consider the intense debate about whether two visual experiences 
can have the same phenomenal character, and yet represent different color properties.  
Such a case would arise if there can be an “inverted spectrum without illusion”, where a 
subject has an experience with the conscious character of our experiences of yellowness, 
even though her experience represents blueness rather than yellowness. 
   Can such a case indeed arise?  According to philosophers such as Block (1990), 
Shoemaker (1994), or Chalmers (2004), the answer to the question is “yes”.  According 
to philosophers such as Tye (1994) or Byrne (2001), the answer to the question is “no.” 
The dialectic about indirect realism should inform the debate about consciousness 
and representation.  To introduce the challenge, we can take Sydney Shoemaker as a 
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proxy for Hume, and Michael Tye as a proxy for Berkeley.  According to Shoemaker 
(1994), when someone has an experience with the phenomenal character of our 
experiences of yellowness, that does not suffice for the representation of yellowness.  
However, having such an experience does suffice for the representation of a distinct 
“appearance property” associated with yellowness, such that normal subjects are aware of 
yellowness by being aware of that appearance property.  Here is what Tye (2000) says in 
response: 
 
if colors are seen by seeing other qualities, not themselves colors, then the fact that a seen object 
has the qualities it is directly visually experienced as having affords no epistemic guarantee that it 
has the color the subject of the experience takes it to have or indeed that it has any color at all.  
That again seems very counterintuitive. . . The general problem here is that distinguishing between 
the experienced character of a color and the color itself effectively draws a veil over the color 
(103). 
 
Tye’s objection is a demand for an epistemic guarantee.  Since I take it be 
controversial whether our experiences afford us any certainty about how the external 
world is, I’ll instead develop the objection in terms of whether our experiences give us 
justification for our color beliefs.  
Here is one objection in the vicinity (I have reserved discussion of Tye’s own 
objection for a footnote).8  First, if Shoemaker’s view is true, we lack direct perceptual 
awareness of colors in having our color experiences.  That is to say, if we have perceptual 
awareness of colors at all, we have that awareness at best by having perceptual awareness 
of other properties which are not themselves colors.9  Second, if we are not directly aware 
of colors in having our color experiences, our experiences do not have color contents as 
phenomenal contents.  But our experiences only give us justification to believe that P 
when they have the phenomenal content that P.  Therefore, if Shoemaker’s view is true, 
our color experiences do not justify our color beliefs.    
There is a natural response to this objection, just as there was in the case of 
Berkeley.  One can insist that, even if Shoemaker’s view is true, our experiences still give 
us justification for our color beliefs, namely thanks to a further contribution from the 
good standing of background beliefs (Kriegel 2002).  At a minimum, it is a mistake to say 
that our experiences only give us justification to believe their phenomenal contents.  
Suppose you see a newspaper on your doorstep on a snowy day, and form a belief that 
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your paper has been delivered despite the storm.  Here your experience justifies your 
belief thanks to the standing of background beliefs, even though it is no content of your 
visual experience that [your paper has been delivered despite the storm]. 
As before, however, the response is ultimately unsatisfying (although the point 
that perceptual justification can outstrip perceptual content should be taken on board by 
all).  Imagine again you are looking at a lemon and you demonstrate it, this time forming 
a belief you express by saying “that is yellow”.  Can’t such a belief be justified by 
experience alone? 
The best “veil” objection in the vicinity is not in terms of justification simpliciter.  
The best objection is instead in terms of the notion of immediate justification (Pryor 
2005).  Your experience gives you immediate justification to believe that P just in case it 
gives you justification to believe that P, and does so in a way that is not in virtue of your 
having justification for other beliefs. For example, if you are in severe pain, your pain 
plausibly gives you immediate justification to believe you are in pain.  Your pain gives 
you justification to believe you are in pain, and your having reason to hold other beliefs 
plays no role in giving you that justification to believe that you are in pain.10   
Notice that the notion of immediate justification is a structural one.  If your 
experience only gives you non-immediate justification to believe that P, that does not yet 
mean that you must consciously infer that P from other beliefs to form a justified belief 
that P.  If your experience gives you non-immediate justification to believe that P, that 
means your experience gives you justification to believe that P only in a way which relies 
on your having justification in place for further beliefs.  The key point is about the 
structure of justification rather than the psychology of belief formation. 
 We can now formulate the central premise of the better objection as follows: 
 
(The Content Constraint): If your visual experience E gives you 
immediate justification to believe some external world proposition that P, 
then it’s a phenomenal content of E that P. 
 
According to this proposal, the phenomenology of our experiences fixes certain contents 
of the experiences, and only those contents are fit to be the contents of beliefs 
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immediately justified by experiences.  I take the Content Constraint to be plausible.  In 
any event, we will soon survey the case in its favor in more detail. 
 The rest of the objection will continue much as before.  If the Content Constraint 
is true, Shoemaker’s view will entail that our experiences do not give us immediate 
justification for color beliefs.  But this consequence of the view is plausibly false.  There 
is a sharp difference between the way your newspaper belief is justified, and the way 
your color belief is justified.  The difference is plausibly a matter of the kind of 
justification you enjoy for each belief, where you enjoy immediate justification for the 
color belief although not for the newspaper belief.  The objector will conclude that 
Shoemaker’s view is false since it rules out that we have immediate perceptual 
justification for color beliefs. 
Summing up, the old “veil of perception” worry arises in the contemporary debate 
about consciousness and representation, and the best articulation of the worry is in terms 
of the Content Constraint.   
The Content Constraint is significant because of its role in the philosophy of 
mind, but it is also important because of its role in epistemology.  Consider the following 
classic question: which of our beliefs can be immediately justified by experiences?  My 
belief that something is white is a good candidate to be immediately justified by 
experience, my belief that something is a white light switch bought on Sunday is a poor 
candidate to be immediately justified by experience.  But what principled distinction is 
there between those beliefs which get to be immediately justified by experiences and 
those which don’t?  Call this question the scope question. 
The scope question is especially pressing for foundationalists, who hold that the 
epistemic standing of any (justified) empirical belief must rest on immediately justified 
perceptual beliefs.  The scope question is also crucial for those who endorse a Moorean 
response to skepticism, according to which our experiences themselves justify us in 
rejecting skeptical hypotheses about our experiences.  But the question arises for anyone 
who allows that our experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the 
external world (more soon about those who deny our experiences ever do such a thing).11  
 An important hint to answering the scope question brings in the role of 
consciousness in the epistemology of perceptual beliefs.  Compare a subject who enjoys 
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conscious visual experience of a ball, and a blind-sighted subject who does not have 
conscious visual experience of a ball, but who nevertheless registers the presence of a 
ball in non-conscious informational processing, and who is willing and able to make 
judgments about whether or not a ball is present.  The matter is controversial, but I take it 
that the sighted subject has more justification to believe that there is a ball in front of him 
than the blind-sighted subject, and I take that the sighted subject has more justification 
for his belief due to the visual phenomenology he enjoys (see e.g. Johnston 2006).  The 
“perceptual beliefs” of blind-sighted subjects are not justified in the same way as our 
perceptual beliefs, and not to the same degree as our perceptual beliefs.  Given that visual 
phenomenology is part of the source of the justification of our perceptual beliefs, it is 
reasonable to expect that phenomenology in some way constrains the question of which 
beliefs are immediately justified by experiences.  In particular, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will bear some special relation to the phenomenology of our visual experiences. 
 The Content Constraint is a simple proposal about what relation a perceptual 
belief must bear to phenomenology to be immediately justified by an experience.  It 
should be of interest to any epistemologist as an answer to the scope question.  And it 
should be attractive to any epistemologist who privileges the role of consciousness in 
perceptual justification.  
There is of course a different proposal about which beliefs get to be immediately 
justified by experiences: 
 
(The Weaker Constraint): If your visual experience E gives you 
immediate justification to believe some external world proposition that P, 
then it’s a content of E that P. 
 
This proposal is even simpler and weaker because it abandons the notion of phenomenal 
content.  It is a less useful starting point for this reason as well---it will not help us 
develop the debate about consciousness and representation.  We will also see that the 
Weaker Constraint is no better an ending point either.  We will see that an experience can 
give one immediate justification to believe that P when the experience does not have the 
content that P at all, let alone the phenomenal content that P.  
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 By evaluating the Weaker Constraint in what follows, we will do further 
important work in epistemology---we will take on the question of the extent to which 
representational facts about experiences constrain epistemic facts about experiences.   
We will soon evaluate the Content Constraint and the Weaker Constraint, both for 
the benefit of philosophy of mind and of epistemology.  In order to do so effectively, 
however, we first need a better understanding of the Content Constraint. 
First, on the reading I have in mind, the Content Constraint proposes a 
requirement for one to gain immediate justification from an experience to increase one’s 
confidence or credence at all.  The claim is not merely that, for an experience to give one 
enough immediate justification to believe outright that p, the experience must have the 
phenomenal content that p.  The requirement proposed is instead more general, about 
what it takes for one to gain immediate justification from an experience to increase one’s 
credence at all.  To see why this version of the claim is important, consider that the 
immediate justification we get from experiences could play a role in the rationalization of 
our actions, whether or not experiences give us enough immediate justification for 
outright beliefs. 
Second, let me explain the important restriction of the Content Constraint to 
external world propositions.  We should make this qualification because an experience 
can immediately justify you in believing that you have the experience, whether or not it is 
a phenomenal content of the experience that you have the experience.12   
The restriction to external world beliefs is not ad hoc.  There is an important 
difference between the external and internal world cases.  Even when one lacks 
justification to endorse the content of an experience, say because one has information that 
the world isn’t the way it seems to be, one may remain perfectly justified in believing that 
one has the experience.13   
The next point of clarification to stress is that the Content Constraint proposes a 
necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for an experience to immediately justify a 




(Converse Content Constraint): Necessarily, if some external world proposition 
that P is a phenomenal content of S’s experience E, then E gives S immediate 
justification to believe that P. 
 
One important upshot is that the Content Constraint can be combined with extreme 
externalist views in the epistemology of perception, according to which an experience 
immediately justifies one in believing that p only if one is in the factive mental state of 
seeing that p.  Another important upshot is that one can use the Content Constraint to 
argue that something is a phenomenal content, but one cannot use the thesis to argue that 
something is not a phenomenal content.  One might of course want to use epistemic 
considerations to conclude that something is not a phenomenal content.  For example, 
one might argue that experiences do not have “high level” phenomenal contents such as 
the content that something is a pine tree, by insisting that our experiences never give us 
immediate justification to believe such contents.  To make such an argument one needs 
the Converse Content Constraint rather than the Content Constraint.14 
Finally, let me acknowledge it’s controversial whether our experiences ever 
immediately justify us in holding beliefs about the external world.  According to 
philosophers such as Crispin Wright (2000) and Stewart Cohen (2002), our having reason 
for background beliefs always comes into play when experiences justify beliefs about the 
external world.  On this sort of view, the Content Constraint will at best be vacuously 
true.    
We could in fact formulate something like the Content Constraint without 
assuming that experiences ever immediately justify beliefs.  According to just one 
alternative formulation, if an experience gives one justification to believe that p, and the 
only background beliefs that come into play are from some privileged set, then the 
content that p is a phenomenal content of the experience.  For example, one might think 
(but would not have to think) that the privileged set only includes a priori justified 
beliefs, and that it excludes a posteriori justified beliefs such as one’s beliefs about 
newspaper deliveries and the like. 
Lesson: our discussion does need to be in terms of some notion which is narrower 
than that of justification, but our discussion actually need not require that experiences 
immediately justify some beliefs about the external world.  For the sake of simplicity, 
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however, I’ve formulated the Content Constraint in terms of immediate justification, and 
I’ll continue to run the discussion in terms of immediate justification. 
 
2. The Case for the Content Constraint 
 
We’ve already encountered one defense of the Content Constraint: given that 
consciousness plays a role in the justification of belief, the contents of experiences fixed 
by what it’s like to have them are the best candidates to be the contents of the beliefs 
immediately justified by visual experiences.  We’ll see what’s wrong with this argument 
in the next section, when we will encounter good candidates for immediate justification 
which are bad candidates to be phenomenal contents.  Before doing so, however, we 
should survey further reasons to believe the Content Constraint.  It’s important to 
understand what might motivate someone to accept the claim. 
We may call the first argument the internalist argument, since it relies on the 
following strong internalist thesis in epistemology:  
 
(Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism): If A and B are phenomenally the 
same, then A’s visual experience gives her immediate prima facie 
justification to believe that P just in case B’s visual experience gives her 
immediate prima facie justification to believe that P. 
 
If two people are the same with respect to consciousness, their conscious point of view on 
the world is the same.  The idea here is that, if their conscious point of view on the world 
is the same, then the prima facie justification they enjoy from their experiences should be 
the same as well (it’s allowed that the prima facie justification available to one person 
might be defeated by background information not available to the other). 
The strong internalist thesis will appeal to those who wish to give consciousness a 
very large role to play in epistemology.  According to the thesis, the facts about what it’s 
like to have your experiences are enough to fix the facts about what your experiences 
give you immediate (prima facie) justification to believe.  If someone differs from you in 
terms of what her experience gives her immediate justification to believe, she will have to 
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differ from you with respect to consciousness, it will not be enough for example to differ 
simply in terms of reliability.     
I’ll just grant for the sake of argument that the internalist view is plausible---later 
we’ll see good reason to reject it---and will focus on how to get from it to the Content 
Constraint.  It’s most straightforward to do so by supposing that the Content Constraint is 
false, and then showing that the internalist view must be false if the Content Constraint is 
false.15        
The first step of the argument is straightforward, since it simply describes what 
must be the case if the Content Constraint is false.  If the Content Constraint is false, then 
it is possible that there be someone S1 and someone S2 who meet all of the following 
conditions: 
 
S1 has immediate justification from her visual experience to believe that p 
what it is like to have S2’s visual experience is the same as what it is like to have S1’s 
S2’s visual experience does not have the content that p.   
 
There must be such a case if someone is to be immediately justified by her experience in 
believing a content that is not a phenomenal content of her experience---the person will 
have to have a phenomenal duplicate who lacks an experience with that content.   
The second step of the argument is that, if S2’s visual experience does not have 
the content that p, then S2 does not have immediate justification from her visual 
experience to believe that p.  On this line of thought, in general, a visual experience gives 
one immediate justification to believe (an external world) proposition that p only if the 
experience has the content that p.  This claim will be attractive to those who privilege the 
role of representation in the epistemology of perception.  In what follows we will see 
good reason to reject the second premise, but for now let’s grant that it is true. 
These two steps get us to the claim that, if the Content Constraint is false, then it 
is possible for there to be someone S1 and someone S2 such that their visual experiences 
do not give them immediate justification to believe the same propositions, even though 
what it is like to have their experiences is the same.  The counterexample to the Content 
Constraint will be a counterexample to the internalist thesis in epistemology.  The upshot 
is that, if Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism is to be true, the Content Constraint must be 
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true as well.  According to the fan of the Content Constraint, since we have good reason 
to believe the internalist thesis in epistemology, we have good reason to believe the 
Content Constraint itself.  
We’ve now set out the internalist argument.  In section 3, we will see that it is 
doubly unsound: (1) phenomenal duplicates can differ with respect to what they have 
(prima facie) immediate justification to believe and (2) one can be immediately justified 
by an experience in believing a proposition about the external world that is not a content 
of the experience at all.  In section 4, I will set out a broader view which gives a 
principled explanation of how there can be counterexamples to the extreme internalist 
thesis.   
The internalist argument just set out is quite abstract.  To make the case for the 
Content Constraint vivid, it should be helpful to consider a more concrete example.  The 
strategy here is to leave behind the general internalist thesis, and try to bring out the 
plausibility of the Content Constraint by looking closely at a specific case.  I’ll focus on 
color contents, and consider whether our experiences could immediately justify us in 
believing color contents even if color contents are not phenomenal contents.  Considering 
this case will also give us a sharper understanding of how one might use the Content 
Constraint to argue that color contents are phenomenal contents. 
Suppose that  
 
You are looking at a green patch in optimal visual and epistemic conditions 
You are immediately justified in believing that something is green 
something is green is not a phenomenal content of your experience.   
 
Could it be that all of these claims are jointly true? 
On the classic way of thinking, if something is green is not a phenomenal content 
of your experience, that’s because a certain “inverted spectrum” scenario is possible 
(Shoemaker 1982).  In this situation, someone has an experience phenomenally the same 
as yours (call it a “green feeling” experience).  However, (to simplify) this person’s 
experience is accurate with respect to color just in case something is red, whereas yours is 
accurate with respect to color just in case something is green.16  
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Now consider that, if you are immediately justified in believing that something is 
green by your experience, then your twin is immediately justified in believing that 
something is red by her experience.  This conditional is plausible because it seems that 
nothing privileges your belief that something is green over your twin’s belief that 
something is red.  Neither of you has defeating information that the other lacks.  And we 
can set up the case so that your experiences are both reliable guides to the colors of things 
(this is in fact how inverted spectrum scenarios are standardly set up). 
Presumably you in fact are immediately justified in believing that something is 
green by your experience.  So your twin will then be immediately justified in believing 
that something is red by his or her experience, given the symmetry between you in terms 
of defeaters and reliability.  But I take it to be implausible that the sort of experience you 
have when you look at a green patch in good conditions can immediately justify another 
person in believing that something is red (for related discussion see Johnston 2006).17   
One might of course disagree with this verdict about the cases (I do so myself on 
reflection, although I agree it is plausible on the face of things).  If you disagree with the 
verdict, however, please make sure you are not doing so for either of the following bad 
reasons.  First, one might point out that a green-feeling experience can provide a person 
with justification to believe that something is red, as when someone is informed that she 
has been fitted with lenses which will make red things look green.  This point is correct 
but irrelevant, given that it concerns non-immediate justification.  Second, one might say 
that, for any condition which is reliably correlated with an experience, the experience 
gives one immediate justification to believe that the condition obtains.  This reliabilist 
proposal of a sufficient condition for perceptual justification is not correct, whether or not 
there is some reliabilist necessary condition for perceptual justification.  Our experiences 
are reliably correlated with our brain states, but our experiences do not give us immediate 
justification for any beliefs about which brain states we are in. 
I take it that the question of what to say about cases of spectrum inversion gives 
us some reason to say that our color beliefs are immediately justified only if color 
contents are phenomenal contents.  This will be enough to underwrite an epistemic 
objection to those who allow for an inverted spectrum without illusion, such as 
Shoemaker or Chalmers.  Moreover, an inverted spectrum type case arguably can be 
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constructed for any content of an experience which is not fixed by what it’s like to have 
the experience.  If this further assumption is correct, there’s reason to believe that the 
Content Constraint itself is true. 
 
 A final argument to consider relies on a connection between immediate 
justification and direct awareness.  The core idea is that, if an experience is to 
immediately justify one in a belief which predicates a property, then one must have direct 
perceptual awareness of the property in having the experience.  That is, one must be 
aware of the property in having the experience, but not only by means of being aware of 
some other property.  
Unlike the previous arguments, this one only directly applies to predicative 
contents (we’ll discuss the case of objects later).  The argument at best establishes that, if 
an experience immediately justifies one in ascribing a property F to an object, then every 
experience with the same phenomenal character represents Fness.  The argument is still 
interesting and worth considering, especially since it develops the sort of worry expressed 
by Tye about Shoemaker’s views on color representation.  
The first premise of the argument is that, if you are immediately justified in 
believing that something is F by a visual experience, then you are directly aware of Fness 
in having the visual experience.  To see why someone might make this claim, first 
suppose you are only indirectly aware of Fness in having your experience.  Here one 
might think that, to be aware of Fness by being aware of some other property, the 
standing of your background beliefs must bridge the gap between the two.  Recall 
Russell’s thought that if the real table is not “immediately known” to us (i.e. not an object 
of direct awareness), then it “must be an inference from what is immediately known” 
(1912: 11).”  But if your awareness of Fness is mediated by the standing of your 
background beliefs, you arguably do not have immediate justification to believe that 
something is F.  Now suppose instead that you are not aware of Fness at all in having 
your experience.  Here it is even harder to see how your experience could immediately 
justify you in believing that something is F.  If you are not aware of Fness in having your 
experience, why should your experience immediately justify you in believing that 
something is F rather than in believing something else? 
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The second premise of the argument draws a connection between direct 
awareness of properties and phenomenal content.  If you are directly aware of Fness in 
having your experience, then your experience must represent Fness, along with every 
experience phenomenally the same as yours. 
The two premises get us to the following conclusion: if you are immediately 
justified in a color belief by an experience, then the predicative color content of the 
experience must be fixed by its phenomenology.  More generally, if you are immediately 
justified by a visual experience in a predicative belief, then the predicative content of 
experience must be fixed by the phenomenology of the experience.  This claim is in the 
vicinity of the Content Constraint, although the Constraint is of course itself more 
general. 
Now that we’ve seen why one might believe the Content Constraint, I’ll turn to 
arguments against it.  In the course of developing objections to the claim, we’ll also see 
exactly where the arguments in its favor went wrong. 
 
 
3. The Case Against the Content Constraint 
 
 
I’ll now present a series of problem cases for the Content Constraint, and a series 
of failed attempts to revise the claim to avoid the problems.  My conclusion is that 
nothing in the vicinity of the claim is true. 
Remember that the Content Constraint, as currently understood, gives a necessary 
condition for one to gain immediate justification to increase one’s confidence or credence 
at all.  We can see that this version is false by seeing that that the following claim is true: 
 
(Incompatibility): It’s possible that one’s visual experience E gives one 
immediate justification to believe that P and gives one immediate justification to 
believe that Q, where it’s impossible that [P and Q]. 
 
In the cases I have in mind, one gets some immediate justification to raise one’s credence 
in various competing hypotheses about the scene, each of which is a good candidate for 
fitting the content of one’s experience.   
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For example, suppose that a card is flashed before your eyes with 11 large dots on 
it, in enough time for you to have a visual experience of it, but without enough time for 
you to carefully count the number of dots.  Here you do not have justification to believe 
outright that there are exactly 11 dots on the card.  Instead, you have justification to 
increase your credence that there are exactly 11 dots on the card, and you also have 
justification to increase your credence that there are exactly 10 spots on the card.  Now 
there is no special reason to say that your justification is non-immediate here.  In this type 
of case, I take it, you acquire some immediate justification to raise your credence that 
there are exactly 11 dots on the card, and you also acquire some immediate justification 
to raise your credence that there are exactly 10 dots on the card.   
Notice I have not yet discussed the content of your visual experience.  If what I 
have said so far about your credences is correct, we actually can avoid controversial 
questions about what exactly your experience represents.  So long as the content of this 
particular experience is consistent, your experience will lack phenomenal content 
corresponding to each of your credences about the exact number of dots of the card.  I 
take it to be uncontroversial that the content of this particular experience is consistent, 
whether or not there are some experiences with inconsistent content such as that involved 
in the Waterfall Illusion.  Given that the content of the dots experience is consistent, 
regardless of what else is true about the content of the experience, the Content Constraint 
will be false.   
We can argue in similar ways by considering cases in which you estimate the 
exact colors of things, their exact heights, their exact distances, and so on.  In each case, 
you gain immediate justification to increase your credence in multiple propositions which 
cannot all be true.  So long as the content of these experiences remains consistent, the 
propositions immediately justified by the experience will outrun their content.18  
 Of course one might resist the argument against the Content Constraint. 
According to the most important line of response, your experience does not give 
you immediate justification to believe highly specific propositions which are 
incompatible with each other, but instead only to believe a less specific proposition.  On a 
cartoon version of the objection, you gain immediate justification to believe that there are 
 18 
either 10 or 11 or 12 dots on the card, but you do not gain immediate justification to 
believe any propositions which are incompatible with each other. 
Here is one challenge for the line of response.  In order for the suggestion to save 
the Content Constraint, the disjunctive proposition in question needs to be a phenomenal 
content of your experience.   
One difficulty is whether the phenomenal content of your experience is properly 
captured in quantitative terms at all.  If the phenomenal content of your experience 
“doesn’t count”, so to speak, we will have a counterexample to the Content Constraint if 
any numerical proposition is immediately justified by the experience.  So even if your 
experience only immediate justifies belief in a disjunctive numerical proposition, or in 
the hedged proposition that there are roughly 10 dots on the card, that would still be 
enough to have a counterexample to the Content Constraint. 
Even setting the difficulty about quantitative content aside, the disjunctive 
proposition that there are 10 or 11 or 12 dots on the card is arguably not a phenomenal 
content of the experience.  If you had an experience with the same phenomenal character 
as the previous one, when presented with a card with 10 dots rather than 11 on it, your 
experience might well fail to be veridical with respect to the number of dots on the card.  
The difference between there being 10 and 11 dots on the card is after all a large scale 
difference, a difference we can reasonably take the content of your experience to bear on.  
Contrast a case in which the location of an object changes by one micron, while the 
phenomenal character of your experience remains the same.  The micron case does not 
involve any change in the veridicality of your experience, but the dot case is very 
different.  Now if your card experience did have the disjunctive phenomenal content, 
your experience would be veridical with respect to the card’s either having 10 or 11 or 12 
dots on it.  So your experience arguably does not have the disjunctive content as 
phenomenal content.  Rather than saving the Content Constraint, then, the suggestion 
threatens to provide a different counterexample to the Content Constraint. 
Of course, there are different ways to develop the suggested line of response.  
Another idea is that you gain immediate justification to believe that that is thus, where 
the proposition in question is not explicit in any way about the number of dots on the 
card.  The claim is again that you only have non-immediate justification to believe that 
 19 
the card has exactly 10 dots, only non-immediate justification to believe that the card has 
exactly 11 dots, and so on.   
Here is another challenge for the response (it arises for the previous version of the 
response as well).  The challenge brings out an important point about how “immediate 
justification” is to be understood. 
Let’s grant that your experience merely has the content that that is thus.  The 
question remains of why your justification to believe that the card has exactly 10 dots 
should fail to be immediate.  The natural answer is that you have justification to believe 
that the card has exactly 10 dots only to the degree that you have justification to believe 
that, if that is thus, then the card has exactly 10 dots.  Call this thesis the ceiling thesis.  
The ceiling thesis does not give the response the support it needs. 
Suppose E gives me justification to believe that P (to degree n) only if I have 
justification to believe that Q (to degree n).  This condition is actually not sufficient for E 
to fail to give me immediate justification to believe that P, for it may be that E is itself the 
source of my justification to believe that Q as well as to believe that P.  For example, my 
pain gives me justification to believe I am in pain only if I have justification to believe I 
have a sensation, but my pain is itself the source of my justification to believe that I am in 
pain as well as the source of my justification to believe I have a sensation.   
I maintain we have the same type of structure in the dots case.  Just as your 
experience is plausibly what justifies you in raising your confidence that that is thus, your 
experience is plausibly what justifies you in raising your confidence that, if that is thus, 
then there are exactly 10 dots on the card.  The ceiling thesis plausibly is correct.  But the 
ceiling thesis allows for you to have immediate justification to believe that there are 
exactly 10 dots on the card. 
It may well be that your credence that there are exactly 10 dots on the card is 
somehow psychologically downstream from your credence that that is thus.  But your 
justification for believing the downstream proposition can remain immediate for all that.  
And this epistemological question about the character of your justification is the critical 
one, rather than any psychological question about how your level of confidence is 
formed.19 
In sum, I take the dots example to show that the Content Constraint is false.   
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The present case against the claim is important for a further reason.  Recall the 
following claim in the vicinity of the Content Constraint: 
 
(The Weaker Constraint): If S’s visual experience E gives S immediate 
justification to believe some external world proposition that P, then it’s a 
content of E that P. 
 
This weaker claim leaves out the demand for phenomenal contents.  However, our 
current case shows that this weaker claim is false.  Since your experience gives you 
immediate justification to increase your confidence in each of two inconsistent 
propositions, while itself having consistent content, even the Weaker Constraint is false.  
This point is important in its own right---one might easily be tempted to accept the 
Weaker Constraint.  The point is also important as far the defense of the Content 
Constraint itself is concerned.  The first argument for the Content Constraint we 
considered assumed that the Weaker Constraint is true.  We can now see that this 
argument is unsound. 
 The case suggests a further point about perceptual justification.  In it, your 
experience gives you immediate justification to raise your confidence in each of several 
incompatible propositions, without giving you enough immediate justification to believe 
any of them outright.  Now assume that one of the propositions is indeed a content of the 
experience.  If this assumption is true, then an experience can have the content that P, 
without giving you enough immediate justification to have an outright belief that P.  This 
point would be an important caution against overstating the epistemic powers of 
experiences.   
In response to the case just set out, a proponent of the Content Constraint might 
then naturally retreat to the following claim: 
 
(The Content Constraint II): If a visual experience E gives you enough 
immediate justification to have an outright belief that P, then it’s a phenomenal 
content of your experience that P. 
 
By concerning outright belief alone, the new formulation avoids the previous examples. 
 21 
We can see what’s wrong with the new formulation by considering judgments of 
comparative similarity.  Consider my judgment, when looking down at a plate, that some 
shape before me resembles a circle more than an ellipse.  Or consider my judgment, when 
looking at the clear sky, that [that color is more similar to purpleness than that color is 
similar to yellowness] (Johnston 1992, Byrne 2005a).  These are propositions about the 
external world.  The first one requires that there is in fact a shape in front of me, the 
second concerns what color properties are like rather than merely what my own 
experiences are like (even on dispositionalist views of color, claims about colors are not 
just claims about one’s mind).  In each case, a visual experience can give me enough 
justification to have an outright belief in the comparative proposition, without 
background beliefs figuring in the way I get the justification from my experience.  
Moreover, in such cases the comparative proposition is a poor candidate to be a content 
of my experience, let alone a phenomenal content of my experience (Byrne 2005a, 
section 6).  Of course, the claim about what content one’s experience has could be 
disputed, but I take it to be plausible (in a footnote I present a further example).20   
Sometimes reflection on your experience can make a proposition about the 
external world obvious to you, without the standing of your background information 
playing a justifying role, even when the proposition is not a phenomenal content of the 
experience.  Once again, moreover, an experience sometimes immediately justifies you in 
believing a proposition about the external world which isn’t a content of your experience 
at all.  
 
 There’s a further version of the Content Constraint I will now evaluate.  It’s 
meant to take account of the complication that your experience can justify you in 
believing a content that your experience doesn’t even have:    
 
(The Content Constraint III): If S’s experience E gives S enough immediate 
justification to have an outright belief that P, then any experience with the 
phenomenal character of E is fully accurate only if it is the case that P.   
 
This formulate is compatible with the examples considered so far.  To argue that it is not 
ad hoc, one might emphasis that it also accommodates views on which the contents of 
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experiences are different entities from the contents of beliefs (Evans 1982).  For example, 
one might think that the contents of experiences are sets of possible worlds and the 
contents of beliefs are not sets of possible worlds (this view is mentioned although not 
endorsed by Byrne 2005b).  Or one might think that experiences do not have contents 
which are truth-apt at all (Burge 2003).  So the new formulation, arguably unlike the 
previous formulations, respects a broad range of views about the contents of experiences 
and the contents of belief.  This arguably gives us reason to prefer the formulation.21   
A disadvantage of the new formulation is that it is false. 
The main difficulty comes up from the central case of demonstrative beliefs about 
one’s environment.  For example, suppose I’m looking at a beachball, and I form a belief 
in the proposition that is round, on the basis of my visual experience.  It’s very plausible 
that I’m immediately justified in believing the proposition by my visual experience, and 
in particular that the experience gives me enough immediate justification to believe the 
proposition outright.  It doesn’t seem that my experience only immediately justifies me in 
a belief that something is round, from which I must somehow transition to get to the 
demonstrative proposition.  To bring out why this is plausible, consider a rendition of 
Moore’s proof of the external world as starting with the belief that “this is a hand”.  What 
would be objectionable here is that Moore could legitimately appeal to such a premise to 
raise his confidence in the existence of the external world, not that he could have 
immediate justification from his experience to believe the premise.  The complaint would 
not be that he must start from “something is a hand” rather than “this is a hand”. 
We now have a counterexample to the new formulation of the Content Constraint.  
If that is round is a phenomenal content of my experience, then for any experience with 
the conscious character of mine, that experience is fully accurate only if that is round is 
true, since the experience will have that is round as a content as well.  But this condition 
is not met.  Consider someone confronted with a numerically different beachball which 
looks just the same as mine.  The beachball I am looking at has nothing to do with the 
accuracy of his experience, even though what it’s like to have the experience is the same 
as what it’s like to have mine.22  In particular, it can be that (i) that is round is false and 
(ii) the other person’s experience of a different beachball is entirely accurate.  If the other 
person’s experience is fully accurate, and that is round is false, that is round is not a 
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content of his experience.  Given that he is a phenomenal duplicate of me, that is round 
is not a phenomenal content of my experience.   
Since my experience does give me immediate justification to believe that is 
round outright, the third version of the Content Constraint is mistaken.  
The case of demonstrative beliefs is extremely important.  For one thing, it 
provides further evidence against the two previous formulations.  This does not mean that 
the previous cases are now idle---there are now multiple strands of evidence against the 
previous formulations of the Content Constraint.  Also, since experiences arguably do 
have singular contents such as that is round, the current case is not effective against the 
Weaker Constraint, which said that our experiences give us immediate justification only 
to believe their contents.23  We need the earlier cases to show that the Weaker Constraint 
is false.     
The case of demonstrative beliefs also undermines the thesis of Phenomenal 
Epistemic Internalism, which roughly said that the experiences of phenomenal duplicates 
immediately justify them in the same beliefs.  We can now see that the thesis is wrong.  
People can be phenomenally the same even though they are immediately justified in 
holding different demonstrative beliefs (our earlier cases were not suited to make this 
point). 
 One might of course try to refine the Content Constraint in some further way.  But 
I don’t see any way to save the thesis that is not ad hoc, nor any revision which would 
allow the thesis to play to the role of being a guide to the phenomenal contents of 
experience.  We have good reason to believe that the Content Constraint is false, and that 
every important thesis in the ballpark is false as well. 
 
4. The role of phenomenology 
 
 It’s one thing to show that you can be immediately justified by an experience in 
believing an external world proposition that is not a phenomenal content of the 
experience.  It’s another to explain how this is possible.  In particular, it’s quite another 
thing to explain how it is possible for experiences to immediately justify us in believing 
demonstrative contents even if demonstrative contents are not phenomenal contents, or to 
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explain how it is possible for experiences to immediately justify us in color beliefs even 
if color contents are not phenomenal contents.  In this section I will take on the positive 
explanatory task.  Of course, we saw other counterexamples to the Content Constraint in 
the previous section, but I’ll focus on color and demonstrative beliefs.  They are after all 
among the most fundamental of our beliefs about the external world.24 
 There’s a lot of controversy about whether color contents in fact fail to be 
phenomenal contents of experiences---in this section I will simply assume that color 
contents are not phenomenal contents.  One of my main aims is to outline what you 
should say about the epistemology of the inverted spectrum without illusion, assuming 
that you follow philosophers such as Shoemaker and Chalmers in allowing for such cases 
at all.  My aim in particular is to show what the moderate representationalist should say 
about the epistemology of such cases, where the moderate representationalist allows that 
some content in the vicinity of color content is fixed by phenomenology, even though 
color contents themselves are not (more soon about the details of the position).   
My driving idea is that immediate justification is tolerant of non-epistemic forms 
of mediation.  In particular, in the terminology I will use here, we can be immediately 
justified by experiences in believing indirect contents of experiences.  A content that P of 
an experience is indirect if the experience has the content that P, and has the content that 
P at least in part in virtue of having some other content that Q.  For example, I take it that 
color experiences have general color contents such as something is red, as well as 
determinate color contents such as something is red21, and I take it that color 
experiences have the former in virtue of having the latter.  One way to bring this out is to 
consider that looking red21 is a way of looking red: everything which looks red21 looks 
red and looks red in virtue of looking red21. 
The key point is that indirect contents of experiences are contents that experiences 
have by way of having other contents.   
 I should give more detail before proceeding further.  The example of general and 
specific color contents may be misleading in some respects.  In the case of color contents, 
having the content that something is red21 is arguably a sufficient condition for having 
the content that something is red, and one might think that both contents are phenomenal 
contents.  However, I do not hold that, whenever a content c2 of an experience derives 
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from a content c1 of the experience, having c1 is a sufficient condition for the experience 
to have c2.  The crucial point is that, when a content c2 of an experience derives from a 
content c1 of the experience, part of what makes it the case that the experience has c2 is 
that it has c1. 
The central idea I will work with is that 
 
(Content Mediation): When an experience has the indirect content that P, an 
experience can immediately justify you in believing that P even if it is not a 
phenomenal content of the experience that P.25   
 
This is not yet to say that, whenever your experience has the indirect content that P, the 
experience gives you immediate justification to believe that P.  It’s unclear whether you 
always have immediate justification (be it only prima facie justification) to believe the 
contents of your experiences.  The main point is that you sometimes have immediate 
justification to believe non-phenomenal indirect contents of experiences.   
 To pave the way towards my conclusion, I’ll first argue that we can be 
immediately justified by an experience in believing that P when the experience has the 
indirect content that P.  Immediate justification can extend to indirect contents of 
experience.  
I take it that one can be immediately justified in believing that something is red.  
Certainly, the proponents of the Content Constraint can’t quarrel with me here, at least if 
they want to use the thesis to infer that hue contents are phenomenal contents.  However, 
I also take it that, when one’s experience represents something as being red, it ordinarily 
does so by representing the thing as having some more determinate shade such as red21.  
In such cases one can be immediately justified in believing that P, even though the 
proposition that P is an indirect content of the experience. 
 The case shows that one can be immediately justified by an experience in 
believing a proposition that is an indirect content of the experience.26  Of course, it’s 
controversial whether color contents fail to be phenomenal contents.  So we don’t have a 
clear counterexample to the Content Constraint.   
Our example does help us to diagnose another problem with the case for the 
Content Constraint.  The final argument for the claim assumed that, if one’s experience 
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immediately justifies one in believing that something is F, then one is directly aware of 
Fness.  This is a mistake.  I am aware of the redness of the thing only by being aware of 
the more specific red21ness of the thing, and yet I can still be immediately justified in 
believing that the thing is red.  So the final argument for the Content Constraint is 
unsound.  
That argument rests on another important mistake.  The argument is driven by the 
thought that, if one is indirectly aware of Fness in having an experience, then one is 
aware of Fness in having the experience only because of one’s having independent reason 
to believe some proposition concerning Fness.  This is a mistake because indirect 
awareness need not be dependent on the status of background beliefs.  To take an 
example from the object case, you might be aware of an object in front of you by being 
aware of its surface.  This does not mean that your awareness of the object is 
epistemically mediated by the standing of any background beliefs (Jackson 1977, chap. 
1). 
 Direct awareness is one thing, immediate justification is quite another.  An 
experience can give one immediate justification for a belief concerning x even if one is 
not directly aware of x in having the experience. 
We haven’t yet said enough to reach my main conclusion, since it could be that all 
indirect contents of experience are nevertheless phenomenal contents of experience.  We 
need to see how we could be immediately justified in believing an indirect content of an 
experience, even when that content is not a phenomenal content of the experience. 
 To answer the question I will first outline an existing view according to which 
demonstrative and color contents are indirect, and I will then describe some of the 
epistemological virtues of the view.  Let’s call the view the “neo-Fregean” view. 
 The first stage of the view assigns phenomenal contents to experiences which are 
both “neo-Fregean” and in one sense “object-independent” (see Chalmers 2004 for the 
most relevant version of the view).27  The best way to understand the view is to work 
with examples.  Since it’s too controversial and difficult to pin down complete 
phenomenal contents of experiences, I will work with simplified examples which are 
good enough to give a feel for the view.  To take a toy example in the color case, then, a 
phenomenal content of a reddish experience would be the condition is a typical cause of 
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reddish experiences, satisfied by redness in our world, and satisfied by greenness in other 
worlds.  To take a toy example in the object case, a phenomenal content of a Tweedlish 
experience would be the condition the object causing this experience, satisfied by 
Tweedledum in one case, and by Tweedledee in another case.  No doubt more must be 
added to capture the phenomenal contents of experiences---one problem is there are too 
many or too few satisfiers of the conditions outlined above.  Still, I take it that the 
sketches above will at least be components of the final story.28   
On the second stage of the view, experiences standardly have non-phenomenal 
contents which are determined by their neo-Fregean phenomenal contents.  The neo-
Fregean contents are conditions on extension, and at least some non-phenomenal contents 
of experience consist of those objects and properties which satisfy the conditions on 
extension (assuming that something does satisfy the conditions on extension).  Since neo-
Fregean phenomenal contents play a specificational role, we can think of them as “modes 
of presentation”.  In turn experiences will have non-phenomenal contents which consist 
of satisfiers of the relevant specifications.  In particular, color contents and demonstrative 
contents will be non-phenomenal contents of experiences, contents experiences have in 
part in virtue of their specificational phenomenal contents.29 
 There are of course a number of refinements and problems of the neo-Fregean 
view of perceptual content.  I set aside those general issues.  Crucial here are the virtues 
of the neo-Fregean view with the present project.30 
 First, the neo-Fregean theory spells out a clear way in which a content of an 
experience could be indirect.  In particular, the theory supplies us with a relation between 
contents which suffices for one content to be had in part in virtue of another.  The relation 
in question is causal and satisfactional.  More precisely, when an experience has some 
neo-Fregean content, and the constituents of some proposition P satisfy the (partly 
causal) conditions laid down by the neo-Fregean content, then the experience will have 
the content that P.  For example, when a color satisfies the condition on extension laid 
down by the predicative phenomenal content of a color experience, the experience will 
have the color content partly in virtue of having the phenomenal content it does.  And 
when an object satisfies the condition on extension laid down by the object-oriented 
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phenomenal content of an experience, the experience will have the object-oriented 
content in partly in virtue of having the phenomenal content it does.    
Second, and crucially, the neo-Fregean theory allows for both color and 
demonstrative beliefs to be immediately justified.  The key feature of the view is that, 
when a neo-Fregean content of an experience is the base for a non-phenomenal content of 
the experience, your reason to hold background beliefs need not play any role in 
determining the non-phenomenal content of your experience.  The relevant work is done 
instead by your embedding in your environment, and in particular your causal relation to 
your environment.  So now consider what happens when you have an experience with a 
certain phenomenology, and you take the experience at face value.  When you take the 
experience at face value, you end up endorsing whichever non-phenomenal content it has.  
In one setting, you might endorse the proposition that that1 is red, and in another setting 
(where you have an experience with the same phenomenal character) you might endorse 
the different proposition that that2 is green.  Which proposition you end up endorsing, 
however, can be a matter of how you are related to your environment rather than a matter 
of what background beliefs are independently justified for you.  Here the causal element 
of the phenomenal content plays a critical role, by allowing your experience to acquire 
different non-phenomenal contents in different environments, without the mediation of 
your reason to hold background beliefs.  There is therefore no barrier here to saying that 
you are immediately justified in the belief you form by endorsing your experience.     
If one allows that experiences immediately justify external world beliefs, one 
should allow that experiences can immediately justify beliefs which are formed simply by 
taking the experiences at face value.  On the neo-Fregean approach I have in mind, even 
though demonstrative and color contents fail to be phenomenal contents, demonstrative 
and color beliefs can still be formed simply by taking experiences at face value.  So the 
proponent of this neo-Fregean view is in a good position to allow that experiences 
immediately justify color and demonstrative beliefs, and the neo-Fregean theorist has a 
good explanation of how they can do this.    
Third, the neo-Fregean theory is general, applying both to the case of predicative 
content and to the case of object-oriented content.  What’s less obvious is that here we 
have an advantage of the theory over the rival sort of view pioneered by Sydney 
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Shoemaker, on which the (predicative) phenomenal content of a color experience is a 
special kind of property rather than a mode of presentation that might fail to be a 
property.  (It is not mandatory to deny that modes of presentation are properties, but it is 
easier to get a contrast with Shoemaker if we do).31  According to Shoemaker, when a 
normal subject looks at a ripe tomato in normal conditions, and a spectrally inverted 
subject looks at a lime in normal conditions, there is a property represented by both of 
their experiences.  This property is not a color but instead an “appearance property” in 
some way individuated by the phenomenology of their experiences (I leave open exactly 
how to construe “appearance properties”, Shoemaker has made various proposals about 
this over the years).32  
Shoemaker’s moderate representationalist view has the resources to account for 
the immediate justification of color beliefs by color experiences.  He can say that we are 
aware of colors by being aware of appearance properties, and he can say that our indirect 
awareness of colors allows for the immediate justification of our color beliefs. The 
indirect awareness in question need not depend on justified background beliefs, so he is 
in as good a position as the neo-Fregean to say that color beliefs are immediately justified 
by color experiences.   
The disadvantage of Shoemaker’s view is that it doesn’t say anything about the 
equally important case of demonstrative judgments.  The neo-Fregean theory does.  So 
the neo-Fregean theory has the advantage of applying in a wider range of cases than 
Shoemaker’s theory.33 
 A fourth virtue of the neo-Fregean view is that it preserves a justifying role for 
phenomenology, despite allowing that experiences can immediately justify contents 
which do not supervene on phenomenology.  The rough idea is that, when the modes of 
presentation which figure in the phenomenal content of an experience are the same as the 
modes of presentation which figure in a judgment, the experience may immediately 
justify one in holding the judgment (given the absence of defeaters and so on).  The 
phenomenology of the experience fixes a mode of presentation of a given object and of a 
given property.  When you think of the object and property in the way they are presented 
to you in your visual experience, you will other things being equal be immediately 
justified in ascribing the property to the object.  What matters is the sameness of the 
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mode of presentation which figures in the experience and in the judgment.  Thus, if two 
different thinkers are phenomenally the same, and different objects and properties satisfy 
the same modes of presentation, different judgments will be immediately justified by the 
same phenomenology.   
  One might object that the view leaves open exactly how the phenomenal 
character of an experience plays a justifying role.  In particular, as developed so far, the 
view leaves open the possibility that a blind-sighted subject enjoys the phenomenal 
contents of my color experiences without enjoying their phenomenology (it’s written in 
to the definition of “phenomenal content” that it supervenes on phenomenology, not that 
it requires phenomenology).  So the neo-Fregean view could allow that a blind-sighted 
subject is justified in the way and to the degree that conscious subjects are.   
In response, I don’t think we should expect views about the contents of 
experience to explain the justifying role of phenomenology.  If experiences and beliefs 
may share their contents, the point is especially clear, since beliefs plainly don’t play the 
same justifying role as experiences.  Even if experiences and beliefs never share their 
contents, however, there is still every reason to expect the nature of the conscious attitude 
involved in conscious experience to play the central justifying role.  The crucial point 
here is that the neo-Fregean view respects the justifying role of phenomenology.34 
I have no proof of the theory just outlined.  But I am aware of no other theory 
which has the advantages just described.  At a minimum, we have a novel argument in 
favor of the view that experiences have neo-Fregean phenomenal contents: it explains 
how experiences can immediately justify us in believing propositions that aren’t 
phenomenal contents of the experiences.  In particular, given how plausible it is that 
experiences immediately justify demonstrative contents, and how implausible it is that 
demonstrative contents are phenomenal contents, we have an argument at least for a neo-




I have formulated a novel problem that faces any view on which color contents or 
demonstrative contents are not phenomenal contents.  These views need to explain why it 
is a mistake to expect experiences to immediately justify us in believing such contents, or 
 31 
to explain how it is possible for experiences to immediately justify us in believing such 
contents after all.   
 I hope to have solved the problem, by arguing against the assumption that 
experiences only immediately justify us in believing phenomenal contents, and by setting 
out a positive model of how experiences can give us immediate justification to believe 
contents that are indirect.  This work gives us proper understanding of the role of visual 
consciousness in the justification of perceptual belief, and of the role of visual 
representation in the justification of perceptual belief.  Immediate justification is not 
limited to the phenomenal content of experience, nor even to the content of experience. 
These points do a service in particular for the moderate representationalist in the 
philosophy of mind, and for the foundationalist in epistemology.   
 The problem I have addressed derives from a very old worry in philosophical 
thought about perception.  This is the worry that, if we lack direct perceptual awareness 
of external objects and properties in having our experiences, then our experiences are 
incapable of justifying our beliefs about the external world.  This worry may be old but it 
is not sound.  One might dismiss it for the standard reason that a state of indirect 
awareness can give us non-immediate justification.  The standard response is 
unsatisfying, since our experiences presumably can do better.  Our evaluation of the 
Content Constraint has given us a better way with the classic worry about a “veil of 
perception”.  Even if we are only indirectly aware of external objects and properties in 
having our experiences, our experiences in fact can still immediately justify beliefs about 
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1 Cf. Thomas Reid, who wrote that “Descartes’ system of the human understanding, 
which I shall beg leave to call the ideal system, and which, with some improvements 
made by later writers, is now generally received, hath some original defect; that this 
skepticism is inlaid in it, and reared along with it” (1764/1997: chap 1, section 7) 
2 I am grateful to the editor of Mind for drawing my attention to this passage. 
3 It is one thing to have a justified belief that [x exists], where x is in fact a mind-
independent ordinary object, and it is another to have a justified belief that [x exists and 
is mind-independent ordinary object].  My focus is on the former sort of belief rather than 
the latter. 
4 The characterization of content I use---merely a necessary condition rather than a 
sufficient condition---is intended to be acceptable by as wide an audience as possible.  As 
an anonymous referee pointed out, the characterization might be so undemanding as to be 
acceptable by critics such as Travis (2005) and Brewer (2006); for a response to those 
critics, see Siegel (forthcoming).   
5 Here we’re concerned with specifically visual phenomenology, to which I here assume 
differences in overall phenomenology such as tactile experiences or scratchy throats are 
irrelevant. 
6 It’s tempting, but unhelpful, to gloss “phenomenal content” along the following lines: 
c is a phenomenal content of experience e just in case it’s impossible for two 
experiences phenomenally identical to e to differ with respect to having c as a 
content.   
This definition is unhelpful because it predicts that contents which are impossible for 
experiences to have are phenomenal contents.  For example, I assume that no visual 
experience has the content that 3 is a prime number.  So no two phenomenally identical 
experiences differ with respect to having the content that 3 is a prime number.  But it is at 
best misleading to say that a phenomenal content of each visual experience is that 3 is a 
prime number.   
A further wrinkle: some philosophers such as Stalnaker (2000) deny that interpersonal 
comparisons of phenomenal character make sense.  I won’t set up the discussion in terms 
which explicitly accommodate that sort of view, but please note that the discussion could 
be modified to respect the view.   
7 For sample arguments that experiences have phenomenal contents, see Siewert (1998), 
Byrne (2001), or Tye (2002). 
Notice that phenomenal contents of experiences are not defined as being narrow contents, 
where a content is narrow if it is not individuated by one’s relations to the environment.  
For all we’ve said, it might be that the phenomenal contents of experiences are 
themselves externally individuated (Lycan 2001).  
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8 I take Tye’s own objection to be considerably more complex.  I take him to insist that, if 
we do not directly see the colors of things, then we have no entitlement to be certain that 
the following conditional is true: if a thing has all the qualities such that we directly 
perceive it to have them, then it has the color we take it to have.  
In response, I don’t we should expect a guarantee of the kind demanded by Tye.  
So it’s no objection to Shoemaker’s view if it entails that there’s no such guarantee.  To 
see the point, consider the phenomenon of color constancy, and in particular a light 
brown table which is apparently partly in shade.  We take the table to be uniformly light 
brown, on the basis of our visual experience, but we can’t be sure that the table is 
uniformly light brown if it has all the qualities we directly perceive it to have.  In 
particular, we can’t be sure that the following proposition is false: the table has all the 
qualities we directly perceive it to have, but the table is actually a darker shade of brown 
in the apparently shaded parts of its surface. 
9 On the general notion of direct awareness I take to be in play (drawing on useful work 
in Stoljar 2004, which in turn draws on Alston 1971),  
 
(Directness): You have direct perceptual awareness of a property F just 
in case you are perceptually aware of F and you are not perceptually 
aware of F only by means of being perceptually aware of some property 
G not identical with F.  
 
Notice, one could say that we see color qualities directly and also by seeing qualities 
which are not themselves colors, but it’s not clear what would support such a view. 
Also, notice that it’s controversial whether we are ever aware at all of qualities in having 
visual experiences (for useful discussion, see Pautz 2007). 
For further useful discussion of how to clarify “direct” and “indirect” perception, see 
Jackson (1977) or Snowdon (1992). 
10 Notice that our definition of “immediate justification” allows that other background 
beliefs might be required for you to so much as entertain the content that p.  The crucial 
focus is on what plays a justificatory role rather than any other role. 
11 Foundationalism is a view about the overall structure of justification, stating roughly 
that the justification of each non-immediately justified belief is traceable to that of some 
immediately justified belief (e.g. Bonjour 1985).  One need not hold this view about the 
overall structure of justification to hold that some beliefs are immediately justified by 
experiences. 
12 According to philosophers such as Searle (1983), experiences have contents which 
involve references to the experiences themselves.  This is not yet to say that an 
experience of mine will have the content that I am having the experience. 
13 It’s worth noting an upshot of the rationale for the restriction.  One might try to invert 
the traditional problem of knowledge of the external world, by arguing that our 
knowledge of our own minds is derivative from our knowledge of the external world, as 
opposed to our knowledge of the external world being derivative on our knowledge of 
our own minds.  Since our knowledge of our own minds is insensitive to the undermining 
of our knowledge of the external world, the proposed reversal of the traditional view is as 
bad as the traditional view itself.   
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14 A difficulty for the strategy is that the Converse Content Constraint is not clearly true.  
One type of problem case is that of experiences with contradictory contents.  Consider 
the famous case of the Waterfall Illusion, which can be generated by attending for a while 
to something that’s moving and then looking at something standing still.  Let’s assume 
that, in such a case, it’s a phenomenal content of your experience that something is both 
moving and standing still.  If that description of the case is correct, it arguably provides a 
counterexample to the Converse Content Constraint, since you arguably don’t get any 
justification to believe a contradiction in such a case.  
15 It is harder to argue in the other direction, from the Content Constraint to the internalist 
claim.  Consider a view on which an experience gives one immediate justification to 
believe that p only if one sees that p.  Here it might still be true that an experience gives 
one immediate justification to believe that p only if it is also true that the proposition that 
p is a phenomenal content of the experience.  Yet the view will be inconsistent with 
Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism, assuming that it is possible for someone who sees 
that p to have a phenomenal duplicate who fails to see that p.  Similarly, consider the 
view that an experience gives one immediate justification to believe that p only if it does 
not have the content that p as a result of one’s antecedently believing that p (this 
possibility is discussed in Siegel forthcominga).  Here too one could accept the Content 
Constraint while rejecting the internalist view.  
16 For a detailed survey of different kinds of inverted spectrum cases, with discussion of 
the uses to which they are put, see Byrne (2006). 
17 One can try to strengthen the argument by considering what’s going on in the example 
if Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism is true.   
If Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism is true, then you are not merely immediately 
justified in believing that something is green, but also immediately justified in believing 
that something is red.  After all, you have an “inverted” twin who is immediately justified 
in believing that something is red by an experience with the same phenomenal character 
as yours.  So if the internalist thesis is true, then you are also immediately justified in 
believing that something is red.  But it seems plain that, since you are only looking at a 
lime in normal conditions, you could easily fail to be justified in believing that something 
is red.  Here we have an absurd counterexample to Phenomenal Epistemic Internalism, a 
case we might reasonably seek to forbid.  
18 My cases are related to the famous case of the “speckled hen”.  One classic use of that 
case is to challenge traditional sense-data theories of perception, according to which if it 
appears to you that something is F, then something that is F appears to you.  The speckled 
hen is meant to be a case in which it appears to you that something is many-spotted, 
without there being a number n such that it appears to you that something is n-spotted.  If 
the sense-data theory were true, there would arguably then have to be something that is 
many-spotted, without there being a number n such that the thing is n-spotted.  For 
further discussion, see Ayer 1940, Jackson 1977, Pautz 2007, or Tye 2009. 
A more germane use of the speckled hen is to challenge traditional foundationalist views 
in epistemology, according to which we have extremely privileged access to our 
experiences (this application arguably starts with Chisholm 1942).  In particular, Sosa 
(2003) uses the case to argue that beliefs about our experiences can meet foundationalist 
criteria for being justified, while in fact failing to be justified.  Sosa’s discussion is the 
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one in the literature that is closest to my own.  One major difference is that he looks at 
outright belief about experiences, whereas I look at degrees of belief about the external 
world.  Once we consider degrees of belief, this brings into focus that an experience can 
immediately justify boosting one’s credence in a content the experience lacks.  A focus 
on outright belief will not bring out the point.      
19 According to a very different line of objection, the content of your experience is 
consistent and is determinate with respect to the number of dots on the card, but you have 
immediate justification to believe only those propositions which are at least compatible 
with the content of your experience.  If the content of your experience is that there are 
exactly 11 dots on the card, say, you may well be epistemically blameless in raising your 
confidence that there are exactly 10 dots on the card, but you are not immediately 
justified in so doing.  Notice that, in the cases at hand, you might well fail to have any 
mediate justification to believe the propositions which are incompatible with the 
determinate content of my experience. So then the objection would require that you don’t 
have any justification to believe the propositions which are incompatible with the 
determinate content of your experience.  But this is too harsh, it does seem permissible to 
increase your credence in them. 
20 To approach the further sort of case, first consider my judgment that something before 
me resembles Matt Damon more than Ben Affleck.  Such an example isn’t yet a clear 
counterexample, since here I might rely on independently justified background beliefs 
about the ways things look.  
But now consider comparative judgments which merely involve a supposition 
about the ways things look.  For example, consider the judgment that something before 
me is such that, if this is the way Matt Damon looks and that is the way Ben Affleck 
looks, then something in the scene looks more like Matt Damon than Ben Affleck.  Given 
that one is making a supposition, rather than relying on independently justified 
background information about how things look, there’s no barrier left to saying that one’s 
experience immediately justifies one in making the judgment.  The strategy here is to 
pack in whatever further information one might have been relying on in the original case.  
In such cases, it starts to look outrageous to say that the highly complex comparative 
proposition is a phenomenal content of the experience.  Finally, given that the proposition 
in question still does require that there is something before me, the proposition in 
question is indeed an external world proposition.   
One might object by making the psychological point that one’s belief in the 
conditional is reached by means of performing an inference.  I don’t think the 
psychological point is true, but even if it was true, it would not show that one lacks 
immediate justification.  Again, the key notion of immediate justification we need to use 
is an epistemological notion about the structure of justification, not a psychological 
notion about the way one forms one’s belief. 
21 The earlier formulations arguably could be combined with the view that experiences 
have contents which cannot be taken up in judgment or belief.  To say that an experience 
with the content that p justifies a belief that p is not yet to say that the experience and the 
belief share any particular content.  Compare: to say that one knows that p and believes 
that p is not yet to rule out that knowledge is a relations to facts rather than propositions, 
and belief is a relation to propositions rather than facts. 
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It’s much less clear, however, how the earlier formulations could be combined with the 
specific view that experiences don’t have truth-evaluable contents (Burge (2003)). 
A disadvantage of the new formulation is that it is harder to use in disputes about whether 
color contents are phenomenal contents.  If we are immediately justified in color beliefs 
by color experiences, and the new principle is true, it follows that experiences have 
contents which are entirely accurate only if certain color contents are true, not yet that 
experiences have color contents as phenomenal contents. 
Another disadvantage is that, given its distance from the earlier formulations, it’s unclear 
how the arguments for the earlier formulations support the current claim.   
22 One might deny this (natural) assumption, but I can’t see any good reason for doing so.  
The motivating idea is only that you could have phenomenally identical experiences of 
qualitatively similar but distinct things.  In relying on this idea, we need not assume the 
questionable view that, if you are not in a position to know that two experiences have 
different phenomenal characters, then they have the same phenomenal character.  The 
idea that differences in phenomenal character must be accessible to the subject is 
criticized effectively in Williamson (2000), but the arguments there do not in any way 
support the view that there are no phenomenally identical experiences of distinct things.  
23 For my main purposes, it is crucial that my experience fails to have that is round as a 
phenomenal content, but it may well be that my experience has that is round as a non-
phenomenal content.  For discussion of whether experiences ever have singular contents, 
see Burge (1991), Davies (1992), Soteriou (2000), and Martin (2003). 
24 We saw a variety of cases against versions of the Content Constraint, and I doubt that 
there’s any uniform explanation of what’s going on in all of them.  For example, an 
account of the dots cases will involve the consideration that experiences can justify 
partial beliefs in incompatible propositions, but an account of the further cases won’t 
involve that consideration. 
25 We should not propose that 
 
if your experience immediately justifies you in believing that p, then your 
experience either has the phenomenal content that p, or the indirect content that p. 
 
This proposal implies that an experience immediately justifies you in believing that p 
only if it has the content that p.  We’ve already seen counterexamples to this claim, as in 
our discussion of how an experience with consistent content can immediately justify 
several credences in propositions which are inconsistent. 
26 For potential dissent from the point, see Pryor (2000), where he writes that “Perhaps 
we have immediate justification for some of the things our experiences non-basically 
‘represent’, too.  (I doubt that, but I am not going to defend these doubts here) (n. 38).” 
27 See also Thompson (2007, forthcoming). 
28 For much more worked out proposals about phenomenal contents, see Thompson 
(forthcoming) and the appendix to Chalmers (2005).  Each of these proposals is 
developed by considering judgments about the veridicality of experiences in various 
scenarios in which an experience might be found.    
29 It’s crucial that the phenomenal contents of experiences in question are object-
independent, so that they can be shared by people who perceive different individual 
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objects or fail to perceive any objects at all.  However, we can remain neutral about 
whether all people who are intrinsically the same are also the same with respect to 
phenomenal contents (it may well be that I have an intrinsic duplicate who fails to have 
the same phenomenal content as me).     
30 In particular, one might worry that the causal contents highlighted in the text are too 
sophisticated to reflect the phenomenal character of experiences.  Given my earlier claim 
that similarity relations between colors are not the subject matter of color experiences, the 
worry is especially relevant (thanks here to the editor of Mind). 
I endorse Chalmers’ detailed response to the worry, defended and developed in his 
(2005). 
31 There’s a further point we can now make about one of the arguments for the Content 
Constraint.  The direct awareness argument for the claim made the assumption that, if 
some property does not figure in the phenomenal content of an experience, then one 
cannot be directly aware of the property in having the experience.  This assumption is not 
clearly correct.  If a neo-Fregean view is correct in saying that modes of presentation are 
not themselves properties, this assumption is wrong.  On the neo-Fregean view, a color 
could fail to figure in the phenomenal content of an experience, while still being such that 
one is aware of it without being aware of it by being aware of any other property. 
32 Shoemaker (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003).  A nice discussion of his views can be found in 
Egan (2006).  I should emphasize that I’m bracketing Shoemaker (2006), which is a more 
radical departure from his previous views. 
33 One might of course extend Shoemaker’s theory to account for the epistemology of 
demonstrative judgments.  For example, one might start by emphasizing that one can be 
aware of an object by being aware of its properties [acknowledgement omitted].  I think 
the major disadvantage of this approach, relative to the neo-Fregean approach, is that it 
gives a less rich role for the conscious character of an experience to play in the 
explanation of why an experience has the demonstrative content it does.  A more esoteric 
complication is that, contrary to what one might think, you can be visually aware of the 
property of a thing without being visually aware of the thing the property is a property of.  
Consider this variation on a case from Siegel (2006): you are looking at the sky towards a 
skydiver, who is hurtling towards you in a suit that exactly matches the sky’s shade of 
blue, with no edge contrast with the sky.  Here you arguably fail to see the suit.  
Nevertheless, I take it you still do see the suit’s blueness (it would be obscure otherwise 
why you experience the relevant region of the sky as uniformly blue).  So it’s not clear 
how to develop the suggestion that we are aware of things by being aware of their 
properties, in a way which would provide a good story about the epistemology of 
demonstrative perceptual beliefs. 
34 For useful discussion of what attitude might be involved in visual experience, see 
Siegel (forthcomingb).  For useful discussion of why contents alone won’t explain how 
experiences justify beliefs, see Martin (2001). 
